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Although many statutory provisions have been enacted in West
Virginia with the purpose and the result of liberalizing technical
rules and requirements pertaining to pleading and procedure in
general, it would seem that the law relating to parties, and particularly the law relating to joint contractors, involving both the
adjective and the substantive law, has not received sufficient attention in this respect. Pollack v. House & HlermanL recently decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, is interesting in this connection, not because it announces any new doctrine, but because it calls attention to a condition of our law which
strikes one as being rather inconsistent with the modern concept
of contractual liability. In this case, certain real estate was
vested in J. P., one moiety in his own right and the other moiety
as trustee. J. P;, in his personal capacity and as trustee, joined
by his wife, demised the property to the defendant, reserving a
rent. J. P. died, leaving a will constituting J. P., Jr., and T. H.
P. trustees of his estate and executors of his will. M. was appointed by decree of court to act as trustee in execution of the
trust as to which J. P. was trustee in his lifetime. Held., in a suit
against the defendant on a covenant to pay rent, that only the
100 S. E. 275 (W. Va. 1919).
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widow of J. P., she being the surviving obligee in the lease, and
M., substituted trustee, were proper parties plaintiff; that, although J. P., Jr., and T. H. P., as trustees under the will of J.
P., would be entitled (in equity) to a portion of the recovery,
nevertheless they could not join in the action.
At common law, all joint obligees and joint promisees must sue
jointly.2 This rule has not been changed by statute in West
Virginia.s If a joint obligee or promisee refuses to join, the
other or others may nevertheless, on giving indemnity for costs,
use his name as a nominal plaintiff for the purpose of maintaining
the suit.4 Only the use of this formality prevents the mere caprice of one joint obligee or promisee from depriving the other
or others of all legal remedy. Upon the death of one or more of
the joint obligees or promisees, the exclusive legal right to sue
passes to those surviving; and upon the death of the last survivor,
to his personal representative.'
Various reasons are apparent why this method of procedure,
particularly as applying the doctrine of survivorship, is unsatisfactory.
In the first place, the survivor, survivors or the personal representative of the last survivor may refuse to bring suit. In such
event, unless the representative of the deceased obligee or promisee
should be allowed to bring an action solely in the name of the survivor, survivors or personal representative of the last survivor
as nominal plaintiff or plaintiffs, in the same manner in which an
assignee at common law sues in the name of his assignor, his sole
remedy would seem to be in a court of equity. If the rule forbidding the representative of the deceased joint obligee or promisee to sue were merely one of procedure, there would be no legal
obstacle to, and there would be the plainest analogical precedent
for, permitting an action to be brought in the name of a survivor
who refuses to sue. But the rule that the right of a joint obligee
or promisee survives to his coobligee or copromisee and does not
descend to his personal representative, however originating, seem22 PAGE, CONTRACTS, §1143.
The Phoenix Insurance Co v. Fristoe, 53 W. Va. 1, 44 S. E. 253 (1903)
Sandusky o. Oil Company, 63 W. Va. 260, 59 S. E. 1082 (1907) ; Hatfield v.
Cabell County Court, 75 W. Va. 595, S4 S. E. 335 (1915).
'ANDREWS' STErnsN'S PLEADING, 2 el., § 31; 2 PAGE, CONTRACTS, § 1143; 30
,CYc. 107 and note.
sWILL'S GOUILD, PLEADING, 3 ed., 385; 2 PAGE, CONTRACTS, §1144, and cases
cited.
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ingly always has been recognized as one of the substantive law.s
Hence there is no legal right to enforce. The estate of the decedent is denied relief because it has no substantive right, not
merely because there are procedural difficulties in the way.
In the second place, although the survivor does bring an action
and prosecute it to a conclusion, it by no means follows that the
estate of the deceased obligee or promisee has an equal advantage
in the procedure and its results. The survivor may use poor discretion or insufficient diligence in prosecuting a recovery. The
result may be an inadequate recovery, or no recovery at all, although the right of action may be entirely sufficient. But even if
the survivor should obtain an adequate recovery, final relief to
the decedent's estate does not necessarily follow. The survivor
may refuse to pay over the decedent's equitable share to the estate,
in which event an independent suit in equity for an accounting is
the only remedy.7 It is submitted that the representative of a
deceased joint obligee or promisee ought at the least, with reference to both the substantive and the adjective law, to have a status
equivalent to that of a living joint obligee or promisee. 8 The decision in the principal case, in allowing a substitution in the contract as to the decedent's fiduciary capacity but not as to his personal capacity, is a striking illustration of the technical distinctions
growing out of the present rule. Yet the Court beyond a doubt
is correct in recognizing the original trust as a continuing interest
which survived the death of the trustee, while his personal rights
under the contract ceased with his death, or rather survived to
the other obligees--a plain exemplification of the substantive
nature of the legal rule of wurvivorsip.
Practically the same procedural complications and difficulties,
under the connon law, adhere to the process of getting relief
GWLWVLs GOULD, PI.EADING. 6 ed., 385; 2 PAGE, CONTRACTS, §1141; 1 PowEnoy's

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4 ed., § 409; 3 Id., § 1301.
72 PAGE, CONTRACTS.

§1144.

8Statutes have already been passed in some states permitting the personal representative of a deceased joint obligee or promisee to joint with the survivors in an
action at law. 2 PAGE, CONTRACTS, §1144.
gThe decision in the principal case is plainly correct, assuming that the common law has not been changed by statute. W. VA. CODE, c. 85, s. 19, reads as
follows: "A personal representative may sue or be sued upon any judgment for
or against, or any contract of, or with his decedent."
There would seem to be
much force in the argument of counsel to the elfect that this atdtuto abolishes the
doctrine of survivorship as to joint contracts. If it does not do so, th6n It is
merely declaratory of the common law applying to sevdral contracts (which the
Court states), and hence is superfluous.
Arguing from the plain language of
the statute, "any contract" certainly must include a joint contract
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against the estate of a deceased joint obligor or promisor. The
death of a joint obligor or promisor discharges his estate from all
legal liability. The liability survives to the surviving obligors or
promisors.10 Where the survivors are insolvent, the obligee or
promisee is permitted to seek relief in equity, but not at law,
against the representative of the deceased obligor or promisor."Otherwise, an action at law is prosecuted to satisfaction against
the survivor and he is forced to seek in equity contribution from
12
the estate of the decedent.
A statute has been enacted in West Virginia"1 placing primary
legal liability upon the estate of the deceased joint obligor or
promisor; but, since this statute has been construed as not permitting joinder of the representative with the survivor or survivors in the same action, 4 it has only partially eliminated the inconveniences of the comnon-law situation. The principal effect of
the statute seems to be to substitute two actions at law for one
action at law and a suit in equity. Since substantive legal liability has been placed upon the estate of the decedent, there is no
apparent reason why this liability and that of the survivors should
not be made joint. As the law now is, we have the anomaly of a
contract exclusively joint at common law made exclusively several
by death of a party and operation of the statute. 5
It is said that there can not be a judgment in a joint action
against a surviving joint contractor and the representative of one
deceased, e. g., an executor, because the judgment would be against
the one as de bonis propriis and against the other as de bonis trsftatoris.'5 While this distinction, although primarily based on
procedural difficulties, is technically correct, it certainly presents
no obstacles that may not be overcome by statutory enactment.
Undoubtedly, pursuing the reasoning of the principal case, the
"2 PAGE, CONTRACTS,
388;

1

BEACH,

UPAGE,

cases.

THE

CONTRACTS,

§1137, and cases cited; WILL's GOULD, PLEADNG,

MODEEN

§1137;

LAw

1

op

CONTRACTS,

6 ed..

§677.

PorsroY, EQUITY

Jur.IS., §409,

citing numerous

In some states the personal representative may be sued in equity regardleos

of solvency of the surveyors. 1 POMEIIOY, EQUITY JURIS., §409.
1-2 PAGE, CONTRACTS, §1137,: citing Erwin v. Dundas, 4 How.
13W. VA. CODE, C. 99, §13.
IdHOGG,

PLEADINGS

AND

FORMS,

10-11,

citing

58

(U.

S. 1846).

Richardson's Executrix i.

'Jones,

12 Grat. 53, 58 (Va. 1855).
See Henning v. Farnsworth, 41 W. Va. 548, 23 S.
E. 663 (1895) ; Thompson v. Curry, 79 W. Va. 771, 781. 91 S. E. S01 (1917).
"See reference to statutes and decisions of different states in 1 PomF.RoY'3
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,
joinder.

§409,

pp. 769-770, Dote

4, where statutes permit such a

'6HOGG, PLEADINGS AND FORMS, 10-11 : Henning v. Farnsworth, supra.
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West Virginia Supreme Court would hold that a joint judgment
could be taken 'against a survivor in his own right and a substituted trustee, where the substitution is made necessary by death
of the jointly contracting original trustee. Such a judgment
would be against parties in different capacities. Practically, the
procedural difficulties ought not to be any greater in the case of
a personal representative than in the case of a substituted trustee.

-L.C.

DATE FROx WHICH INTEREST ACCRUES ON JUDGMENT IN TORT.The Supreme Court of Appeals in a recent case has removed some
confusion that has confronted the bench and bar on the subject of
the date from which interest is computed in entering up judgment
in a tort action. At least we have the last unmistakable utterance
of a majority of the court. There is a dissenting opinion on this
question by one judge. 2 This decision follows one rendered about
a year previously,3 in which the court divided exactly as in the
'Wehrle v. Wheeling Traction Company, 102 S. E. 289 (1920), decided January 27,
1920 (rehearing denied March 24. 1920), In which it is said: "In the recent care
of Long v. Pocahontas Consolidated Collieries Co., 83 W. Va. 380, 98 S. E. 289,
Judge Williams dissenting, we Ignored the ruling in the Easter Case on this question of interest, and in reversing the judgment below in a tort action rendered
judgment for the plaintiff with interest from the date of the verdict. In the
Easter Case we seem to have been misled by Talbott v. W. Va. C. & P. Ry. Co.,
42 W. Va. 560, opinion by Judge Holt, decided subsequently to the amendment.
of sections 14, 16 and 18 of chapter 131 of the Code, by chapter 120 Acts of the
Legislature, 1882, and to have overlooked our decision in Campbell s,. City of
Elkins, 58 W. Va. 308. As Judge Holt in Talbott v. W. Va. C. & P. Ry. Co. ]refers only to Hawker v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., supra, and Murdocld v. Insurance Co.,
33 W. Va. 407, the latter case Involving a judgment rendered after, but a verdict
rendered before said amendments, he seems to have overlooked the effect of the
amendments of 1882. In Campbell v. City of Elkins, due regard seems to have
been had to the amendments of 1382, and the conclusion there reached that In
tort actions like the present the Judgment should bear interest from the date of
the verdict, as provided in seation 16 of chapter 131, the only provision of the
law applicable in such cases. After a full review of these decisions, we are fully
satisfied that In actions of tort the Juudgment should bear interest from the date of
the verdict."
'Wehrle v. Wheeling Traction Company, 102 S. E. 289 (1920), where, in the dissenting opinion of Judge Williams it is said:
"I dissent from so much only of
the foregoing opinion as holds that Interest on the judgment should run from
the date of the verdict, for the same reason expressed In my dissenting opinion
in the Long p. Pocahontas Consolidated Collieries Case 83 W. Va. 380, 98 S. E.
289. Properly construed, I do not think the statute cited In the opinion applies to
judgments recovered in tort actions."
3Long v. Pocahontas Consol. Collieries Co., 83 W. Va. 280, 98 S. E. 289 (1919).
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